介紹當前新疆宗教不自由的情況
In
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), another Ramadan inevitably ushers
in an intensified campaign to crack down on the Uyghurs’ religious beliefs,
practices, and identity, alongside year-round social, political, and religious
restrictions. As in previous years, local Xinjiang authorities have instituted
a ban on Ramadan fasting this year for Uyghur civil servants and students, prohibited mosque attendance
for Uyghurs under eighteen years of age, monitored mosque sermons and staff,
and forced Uyghur restaurants and businesses to stay open during the daytime. During this year’s Ramadan,
local authorities have taken additional measures to increase the difficulty for
Uyghurs to perform their religious obligations during the Muslim holy month,
leading to stern reaction and condemnation by Muslim countries and
organizations.
Various
local authorities, including municipal, town, and village government officials,
school administrators, and police throughout XUAR have instituted their own
restrictive policies targeting Ramadan fasting and other religious practices.
On several occasions, local authorities provided food to Uyghurs and reportedly
force-fed some Uyghurs during daytime hours when they would otherwise be
fasting. According to Chinese reports authorities in Minfeng County in Hotan
Prefecture attempted to break Uyghurs’ religious prohibitions against drinking
alcohol by holding a beer festival.
In
fact, some local authorities actively promoted cigarette and alcohol
consumption to loosen Uyghurs’ adherence to religious proscriptions. Uyghur
shop owners in Lasikui town in the southwest of Hotan, were ordered to sell
five different types of cigarettes and alcohol by a May deadline, or else they
would be pursued for legal and political responsibilities.
In
addition, Uyghur students have been under considerable pressure from school
administrators to reject religious observance during Ramadan. In the capital
city of Urumqi, Uyghur
students at the Second Affiliated Hospital of Xinjiang Medical University were
instructed not to fast and pray. Uyghur students have been threatened with punishment or
academic expulsion for disobeying these
regulations.
This
year’s Ramadan ban comes amid a stronger central government crackdown on
terrorism and so-called religious extremism in XUAR. On 25 May 2014, Chinese
President Xi Jinping announced a year-long campaign against terrorism in
Xinjiang that would last until June 2015. Xi’s announcement came three days
after Uyghur suicide bombings at an Urumqi marketplace killed thirty-nine
people and injured ninety-four. The XUAR has experienced waves of ongoing
unrest and violence in the years following the July 2009 ethnic riots in Urumqi
that left 197 dead and injured 1,721, according to official Chinese estimates.
Zhang Chunxian, Communist Party chief of Xinjiang, pledged “a people’s war”
against terrorism in the region, which entails enhanced security measures and
“special campaigns to regulate illegal religious activities.” (Congressional-Executive
Commission on China (CECC) Annual Report 2014, p.163.) The
Xinjiang Party chief called for strengthened management of religious affairs and
crackdown on criminal offences by religious extremists. Zhang’s remarks and subsequent
restrictive policies indicate a continuation of the hard-line policies of his
predecessor Wang Lequan on the Xinjiang Uyghur population.
Following
the declaration of the year-long anti-terrorism campaign across China and
especially in Xinjiang, Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang were subject to greater
government interference and restrictions on religious practice. In 2014, Xinjiang
authorities listed seventy-five behaviors of religious extremism to be
reported, scrutinized, and suppressed by authorities. They include not
attending official mosques; praying at mosques outside of one’s village;
refusing to shake hands; resistance to interethnic marriage; refusing to apply
for or accept the government social welfare program; pausing restaurant service
during Ramadan; and teaching Turkish, Urdu, and Arabic. Local authorities also
unveiled Uyghur women, shaved off long beards, confiscated religious texts and
publications from homes, and pressured teachers, even retirees, to disavow
religious practice. In another example, the Yining/Ghulja municipal government
in 2013 organized public
campaigns and training classes against Saudi-inspired Wahhabism.
In
an entertainment TV show made by Hunan TV in Dubai, Chinese actress Ning Jing’s head
and body were superimposed with a cactus to conceal her black veil
and long body dress. These measures and restrictions are part of the broader
campaign to weaken religious observance in Xinjiang.
The
increasingly tense situation in XUAR also comes at a time when China has vowed
to improve Xinjiang’s economy. According to Chinese media, Chinese state-owned enterprises
had invested $95
billion in the first few months of 2014. As a result, Han migrants from other
provinces relocated to Xinjiang in pursuit of new economic opportunities. However, Han migrants are
often given priority in employment over local Uyghurs, thereby contributing to
the widening income inequality between the two ethnic groups. Han-Uyghur inequality and
discriminatory hiring practices continue to be a major source of tension in
interethnic relations. While Kashgar city, a center of Uyghur culture, was being
“innovated” and modernized, Uyghur traditional architectural sites were
destroyed in the process. Furthermore, state-owned enterprises provided unfair
compensation at below market prices when purchasing owned by Uyghurs.
The
rise of Xinjiang violence also comes at a time when Chinese President Xi
Jinping has elevated the region’s geostrategic position as a major conduit in
his “One Belt, One
Road” initiative
to connect China with Southeast Asia, South and Central Asia, the Middle East
and Europe through networks of roads, railways, ports, and pipelines. XUAR,
strategically bordering Central Asian states, has been primed as the major
financial, and logistical center of the Silk Road Economic Belt, according to
local authorities. Xinjiang is a major focal point in the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor, which envisions the construction of a 1,488-mile highway
from Pakistan’s Gwadar port to Kashgar in XUAR, with a parallel oil pipeline
along that route that would provide a safer and shorter energy route that
bypasses the Straits of Malacca. China is also planning to build a high-speed
rail from Urumqi to Germany, crossing Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Iran, and Turkey. The Beijing government has encouraged foreign companies to
invest in China’s comparatively less developed western regions, such as the
XUAR. China has
invited Turkey, which has longstanding linguistic, cultural, and historical
ties to the Xinjiang Uyghurs, to invest in Turkish business such as industrial
park in Xinjiang.
Paradoxically,
those countries
identified by China as straddling its Silk Road map—many of which are
Muslim-majority countries—have expressed concern over the Chinese restrictions
on Uyghur religious practice. In response to the numerous media reports on the Ramadan ban
in Xinjiang this year, several governments have issued critical statements.
Scores of Malaysian demonstrators gathered outside the PRC embassy in Kuala
Lumpur to protest the restrictive policies leveled at the Uyghurs. Al-Azhar
University in Cairo and the International Union on Muslim Scholars have also
expressed concerns over Xinjiang restrictions on Ramadan fasting and praying.
As a Muslim and Turkic country, Turkey’s response has been understandably
strong. The Turkish Foreign Ministry recently said in a statement, “Our people have
been saddened over the news that Uyghur Turks have been banned from fasting or
carrying out other religious duties in the Xinjiang region.” The
statement also added that Turkey has conveyed its concerns to China’s
ambassador in Ankara. The recent Ramadan crackdown has led to vocal protests in
Turkey about the heavy-handedness of Chinese policies towards ethnic Turkic
communities in XUAR. According to some media reports, Chinese citizens living
in Turkey have been harassed in public places in relation to the situation in
Xinjiang.
XUAR
authorities have long justified their repressive measures on the Uyghur
population by tying them to the fight against the “three evil forces” of
separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism in the region. However, the
crackdown on religious practice and identity throughout the past year, which
was aimed at preventing Uyghur terrorist attacks, did not actually lead to a
cessation of conflict. On the contrary, there was a rise in Uyghur violence
targeting checkpoints, police stations, government buildings, and public
marketplaces. A number of violent clashes were directly motivated by the
oppressive controls on religious practice. Some began as protests against intrusions
into Uyghurs’ daily lives—such as the ban on headscarves—and later degenerated
into deadly conflict with Chinese security personnel. Thus far, Chinese authorities have shown
no desire to distinguish between standard Islamic practices such as fasting and
extremist behavior that encourages violence. The bans on Ramadan fasting and prayer,
headscarves, beards, and reading of Islamic texts are all counterproductive, as
they actually serve to increase Uyghur animosity towards local authorities and
will continue to fuel civil and violent resistance by the Uyghurs.
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