China is Forcing Uighurs Abroad to Return Home. Why Aren’t More Countries Refusing to Help?

沈默，只求自保的回族。

The campaign began quietly. Students studying abroad were told to return home. Many did, and their classmates didn’t hear from them afterwards. For those who needed extra incentive to get moving, police detained their families back home. Finally, the ones who refused to comply were rounded up by force.

China is seeking out and recalling members of its ethnic Uighur minority population scattered across the globe. In the case of Egypt, Chinese authorities have relied on Egyptian security to seek out and round up ethnically Uighur Chinese citizens in Cairo. Egyptian security personnel have detained dozens of ethnically Uighur Chinese citizens, some of whom have already been repatriated to China. Many details remain unclear, including the legal residential or student status of some of the Uighurs in Cairo. But the People’s Republic of China’s ability to demand the return of whole groups of minority citizens—without a clear and compelling case for their repatriation, and without any semblance of due process—should be worrying to the international community. Silence in the face of this type of extraterritorial action makes third-party nations complicit in these individuals’ return. Silence suggests that any future actions taken in additional countries would also not be condemned; silence lets those countries’ local security forces know that they need not concern themselves with international criticism.

Starting at the end of January, according to Radio Free Asia (RFA), local officials in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region ordered Uighur students studying abroad to return home. Local security and government officials told RFA that the Xinjiang regional government had launched the recall in order to investigate students’ political views, and “educate them about our country’s laws and current developments.”

The History of Islam in China and the Future of Chinese-Turkish Relations by James D. Frankel*

There is no denying that relations between China and global Islam play an important role on the international stage. Yet China often struggles with Muslims inside its borders, even as it works with Muslim countries in matters of mutual interest. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) borders five majority-Muslim countries.[1] The overland trade network known as the Silk Road historically relied upon the permeability of these borders, which allowed material goods and ideas to be exchanged in both directions. Today, as China increasingly aspires to prominence as a world power, it continues to cultivate relationships with Central Asian states and extend its reach to Muslim countries elsewhere in Asia and Africa, seeking material resources, foreign markets, and influence in strategic regions. Permeable borders along its western frontiers also created populations of Muslims within China.

China’s Muslim population, though indeterminate in size,[2] is much larger than the Muslim population of any western country. Relations between China and the Muslim world are nearly as old as Islam itself, as is the Muslim presence within China. China’s Muslims are an internally diverse population, comprising ten out of fifty-five recognized minority nationalities.[3] They represent “distinct solidarities separated by geography…divided along ethnic, linguistic, economic, educational, sectarian and kinship lines, besides many other factors.”[4]

Some Muslims are less congenial to Chinese rule than others. Particularly among the Uyghur people of Xinjiang, independence movements have received the harshest responses, including government crackdowns, which have been subsumed under the “global war on terror.” Xinjiang, with its rich energy and mineral resources, is strategically and economically vital to the PRC. It must be retained and pacified at any cost, including the repression of Uyghurs.

Ramadan 2015 for Uyghurs: Another Crackdown on Islam in China’s Xinjiang

介紹當前新疆宗教不自由的情況

In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), another Ramadan inevitably ushers in an intensified campaign to crack down on the Uyghurs’ religious beliefs, practices, and identity, alongside year-round social, political, and religious restrictions. As in previous years, local Xinjiang authorities have instituted a ban on Ramadan fasting this year for Uyghur civil servants and students, prohibited mosque attendance for Uyghurs under eighteen years of age, monitored mosque sermons and staff, and forced Uyghur restaurants and businesses to stay open during the daytime. During this year’s Ramadan, local authorities have taken additional measures to increase the difficulty for Uyghurs to perform their religious obligations during the Muslim holy month, leading to stern reaction and condemnation by Muslim countries and organizations.

Various local authorities, including municipal, town, and village government officials, school administrators, and police throughout XUAR have instituted their own restrictive policies targeting Ramadan fasting and other religious practices. On several occasions, local authorities provided food to Uyghurs and reportedly force-fed some Uyghurs during daytime hours when they would otherwise be fasting. According to Chinese reports authorities in Minfeng County in Hotan Prefecture attempted to break Uyghurs’ religious prohibitions against drinking alcohol by holding a beer festival.

In fact, some local authorities actively promoted cigarette and alcohol consumption to loosen Uyghurs’ adherence to religious proscriptions. Uyghur shop owners in Lasikui town in the southwest of Hotan, were ordered to sell five different types of cigarettes and alcohol by a May deadline, or else they would be pursued for legal and political responsibilities.

马海云：新疆宗教政策与“一带一路”

新疆维吾尔穆斯林的斋月困境，再次引起了世界舆论对新疆问题的极大关注。今年4月29日，和田市拉斯奎乡阿克塔什村委会硬性规定维吾尔商铺必须买卖烟酒的红头文件，在国际社交媒体上掀起轩然大波。根据这份文件，该村“辖区内的所有餐馆超市必须在5月1日前在店内摆放五种烟五种酒……必须设专柜且摆放在显眼处，违者封店停业，店主被追究法律及政治责任。”一个月之后，新疆医科大学第二附属医院召开研究生“集中安全教育活动”，严禁老师和学生信仰宗教。

更为挑衅的是，在进入斋月之际，根据“天山网”6月21日的报道，民丰县若克雅乡联合县团委在特开墩村召开首届“开怀畅饮，放飞快乐”啤酒节。其目的是“以现代文化活跃乡村文化生活，占领乡村思想文化舆论阵地，确保农村和谐稳定。” 这些充满歧视和挑衅的地方性法规和实践一出台，就立即引起世界舆论的鞭挞。

新疆基层单位诸如此类的赤裸裸反宗教行为，不但引起了西方国家和海外维吾尔组织对新疆宗教自由问题的强烈关注，也引起了“一带一路”沿岸穆斯林国家对维吾尔穆斯林在斋月期间遭受的压制的忧虑。在穆斯林民众的强烈要求下，马来西亚有关对华友好单位不得不致函中国驻马来西亚大使馆，要求厘清有关维吾尔斋月期间遭受种种限制的报道。土耳其政府也向中国大使馆表达了对新疆压制斋月的“深切忧虑”。以埃及爱兹哈尔大学为代表的宗教界，和以卡塔尔的世界穆斯林学者联盟为代表的学术界，以及其他穆斯林团体和机构，纷纷谴责了新疆在斋月期间反伊斯兰的种种限制和挑衅。

禁维吾尔族封斋适得其反

马海云

“吃什么像什么”的谚语，道出了食者的社会身份：吃什么以及什么时候吃，其实是特定民族的文化标识。因此，一般的政府以为，通过蚕食个体或群体的饮食传统，再辅之以其他配套措施，便可以弱化其社会文化认同。在政策层面上讲，一般政府都会寻求通过改变少数民族的饮食习惯，使其饮食文化趋同于主体民族，来达到同化或弱化少数民族的策略。这样的文化同化政策，据说可以增强政府管控少数民族的能力、增强它们对由多数民族控制的国家的忠诚度。

在穆斯林斋戒月，中国新疆维吾尔族自治区政府采取了诸多饮食政策，试图处理与维吾尔人之间的关系。 新疆政府的饮食政策，包括禁止国家机构的工作人员和在校学生封斋，并为他们在白天提供饮食。因为作为主体民族的汉族，在斋戒月期间无须封斋，所以这些规定本质上是重新社会化维吾尔人的一种举措，试图通过破斋来弱化维吾尔人的穆斯林属性，增强他们的“中国”属性。

封斋是伊斯兰教的五大支柱之一，全球所有的健康穆斯林在这个斋戒月期间都要封斋，以便集中宗教功修、进行个体身心反省以及出散施舍，从而在信仰上更靠近真主，在经济上进行一定程度的财富再分配，在社会上更贴近弱势群体，以便维持一个和谐的社会。作为穆斯林的维吾尔人，如同世界各地的穆斯林民众一样，自然也要责无旁贷地封斋。

“一带一路”与天山两麓

中国的“一带一路”战略勾画出一幅看上去很美的蓝图。这一蓝图描绘了条条大道从欧亚大陆和印度洋地区通向中国的远景：“一带一路”战略基本涵盖了中国几条主要连接西南和西北邻国的路上通道（欧亚大陆），路海通道（中南亚），以及海上通道（环印度洋地区）。

这些经由不同方向、不同国家、不同环境的“路带”所涵盖的地域大部分是穆斯林国家或地区。所以从文化和宗教的视角看，将中国的“一带一路”战略看作是中国对穆斯林世界的战略亦不为过，中国的“一带一路”的成功与否很大程度上取决于中国和穆斯林世界的关系走向。

但是，无论是地理或物理上的“一带一路”，抑或是文化和宗教意义上的“一带一路，” 都不是平坦的康庄大道，而是崎岖不平、错综复杂，充满了挑战。这一方面是由于“一带一路”沿岸或沿线国家的地理、政治、宗教、文化、制度、法律等多样性和复杂性所决定。而另一方面是中国的新疆问题，即作为穆斯林国家的东南亚、中南亚和中东穆斯林国家对中国天山两麓或新疆问题的态度，甚至政策的看法。