The History of Islam in China and the Future of Chinese-Turkish Relations by James D. Frankel*

There is no denying that relations between China and global Islam play an important role on the international stage. Yet China often struggles with Muslims inside its borders, even as it works with Muslim countries in matters of mutual interest. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) borders five majority-Muslim countries.[1] The overland trade network known as the Silk Road historically relied upon the permeability of these borders, which allowed material goods and ideas to be exchanged in both directions. Today, as China increasingly aspires to prominence as a world power, it continues to cultivate relationships with Central Asian states and extend its reach to Muslim countries elsewhere in Asia and Africa, seeking material resources, foreign markets, and influence in strategic regions. Permeable borders along its western frontiers also created populations of Muslims within China.

China’s Muslim population, though indeterminate in size,[2] is much larger than the Muslim population of any western country. Relations between China and the Muslim world are nearly as old as Islam itself, as is the Muslim presence within China. China’s Muslims are an internally diverse population, comprising ten out of fifty-five recognized minority nationalities.[3] They represent “distinct solidarities separated by geography…divided along ethnic, linguistic, economic, educational, sectarian and kinship lines, besides many other factors.”[4]

Some Muslims are less congenial to Chinese rule than others. Particularly among the Uyghur people of Xinjiang, independence movements have received the harshest responses, including government crackdowns, which have been subsumed under the “global war on terror.” Xinjiang, with its rich energy and mineral resources, is strategically and economically vital to the PRC. It must be retained and pacified at any cost, including the repression of Uyghurs.

Uyghur cultural politics has been a persistent impediment to national unity in the PRC. By contrast, members of the Hui minority see themselves as part of the PRC, and thus tend to align themselves with government policies. The Hui are ethnically, linguistically and culturally similar to the Han Chinese majority, so Han-Hui relations are a shining example of minority integration into mainstream society. Beijing uses this relationship to portray itself as the benefactor of Muslims in China. This image has international propaganda value, as kindness to its Muslim citizens is used to persuade Muslim countries of China’s respect for Islam.

The Hui and the Uyghurs, China’s two biggest Muslim minorities, have very different cultural identities and histories. The Hui claim descent from the earliest Muslims to arrive in China under the Tang dynasty (618-906). Arab merchants traveled through the Indian Ocean to eastern port cities on the South China Sea.

Overland trade brought Muslim Arabs, Persians and Turks to the capital at Chang’an (Xi’an). Muslim merchants settled in Tang China, some of them marrying local women, their offspring becoming the earliest ancestors of today’s Hui minority.

The Qing dynasty’s (1644-1911) western territorial expansion ignited hostilities with Muslims of the region, leading to several Muslim rebellions in 18th-19th century. Xinjiang was annexed in the mid-18th century, creating a political situation that endures even today. Xinjiang is home to the Uyghurs, whose history is quite different from the Hui’s. In the 9th century, following the collapse of the powerful Uyghur Khaganate, the Uyghurs were scattered throughout the various oases of present-day Xinjiang, where they converted to Islam between the 10th and 15th centuries. The annexation and occupation of Xinjiang led Uyghurs to rebel against Qing rule, a spirit of resistance that persists in the ongoing struggle against PRC rule today.

Typically, when the PRC boasts of its patronage of Islam in China, the examples are Hui rather than Uyghur. Officially, the same laws apply to all groups, but government statistics do not indicate that most policies benefit the Hui. While mosque schools are booming in Hui communities across China, religious education is strictly circumscribed in Xinjiang, where schools have been raided for hosting “illegal preachers” and children have been arrested for studying the Qur’ān on their own.[5]

Abuses in Xinjiang may have a damaging effect as China attempts to build partnerships with Muslim countries. The PRC would like to be able to use its internal Muslim population to help strengthen its relations with the Muslim world, but the Uyghur problem threatens to complicate them. Reactions from Muslim countries in the wake of the 2009 Ürümqi riots were mixed. Many were silent, willing to tolerate PRC treatment of the Uyghurs in order to maintain friendly relations with Beijing. But one Muslim country has consistently spoken out. Turkey’s response to the Uyghur situation contained the harshest criticism from anywhere in the Muslim world. Then Prime Minister, and current President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan even used the term “genocide” in reference to the Xinjiang situation.[6] Erdoğan’s strong words may have been intended more for domestic purposes than actually to seek genuine redress from Beijing because the Turkish public expressed outrage over the Uyghurs’ plight, whom they regard not only as fellow Muslims, but also as fellow Turks (based on strong ethnic and cultural ties). Turkish people took to the streets in protest of PRC policies, but Ankara needed to protect the relationship it has forged with Beijing in recent years.

Then Turkish Foreign Minister, and current Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu stressed human rights concerns – a point that Turkey, as a democracy, can make better than most Muslim countries. He also asserted, “Turkey has no intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of China as it has respect for China’s territorial integrity,” but the Uyghurs could play the role of a “friendship bridge” between the two countries.[7] Ankara masterfully turned the Uyghur crisis into an opportunity for increased engagement and cooperation in 2010. When Davutoğlu visited Beijing, he made history by landing first in Kashgar and Ürümqi. Davutoğlu stressed that “on one hand Turkey had to protect rights of Uighur Turks, on the other hand it would not harm its relations with a global country.”[8] Davutoğlu’s arrival in Xinjiang symbolically solidified Turkey’s commitment to the Uyghur cause. He literally embraced his fellow Turks and paid his respects at important Uyghur monuments, before continuing on to China proper, where he also visited a Hui mosque. The rest of his six-day visit included high level talks about establishing a “strategic cooperation council” between the two countries, foreign trade, a number of mutually beneficial infrastructure projects and increased cooperation in Central Asia.[9] Davutoğlu also affirmed Turkey’s role as an important international broker and intermediary between East and West: “Turkey’s negotiations traffic with both the US and the EU is ongoing intensely.” He further “stressed the importance of China within the framework of new foreign policy parameters.”[10]

For now, juggling of ethnic constituencies benefits China in its dealings with Muslim countries, as both parties put a noble face on relationships of mutual economic, strategic and political interest. The PRC and its Muslim partners can continue to use China’s Muslims as intermediaries, “friendship bridges,” exploiting a demographic that the US and other western countries cannot. But will this strategy work in the long run? At the present time, China and Turkey can agree to cooperate in Central Asia, but as each grows in regional and international power, will their ambitions eventually collide? Moreover, as China aspires to become a global superpower, will its human rights record, especially as it concerns the Uyghurs, not catch up with it?

* Dr. James Frankel, a practicing Muslim, holds degrees in East Asian Studies and Religion from Columbia University. He is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Cultural and Religious Studies at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, where he is also the Associate Director of the new Centre for the Study of Islamic Culture.

[1] Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

[2] Overall population figures for Muslims in China are elusive and vary according to source.  According to PRC government sources, about 2% of China’s approximately 1.3 billion people are classified as Muslim (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ch.html [updated June 26, 2009]). That would make the overall Muslim population of the PRC somewhere around 20-25 million, though some unofficial estimates reach upwards of 50 or even 100 million.

[3] The ten Muslim minorities are the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrghyz, Uzbek, Tatar, Salar, Bonan, Dongxiang and Tajik.

[4] Frankel, James D. “The ‘Problem’ of Muslim Diversity in China,” in Nadeau, Randall, ed. The Blackwell Companion to Chinese Religions. Oxford: Blackwell, 2012, p. 238.

[5] Turdush, Rukiye. “A Muslim Divide in China: Uyghur Muslims Face Stricter Controls on Religion than Hui Muslims” (Transl. by Mamatjan Juma, written in English by Rachel Vandenbrink) Radio Free Asia 30 Nov. 2012. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/hui-11302012172354.html. 13 Apr. 2013.

[6] Associated Press. “Muslim Countries Mostly Silent on China Unrest: Ethnic Clashes, Crackdown on Uighur Minority Draws Muted Reaction” Asia-Pacific on NBC News 10 Oct. 2012. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31893032/ns/world_news-asiapacific/#.UWtIg79DJzo. 13 Apr. 2013.

[7] Today’s Zaman. “Minister Davutoğlu Conveys Xinjiang Concerns to China”

 TodaysZaman.com 24 Jul. 2009. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-180840-minister-davutoglu-conveys-xinjiang-concerns-to-china.html. 13 Apr. 2013.

[8] Cumhuriyet. “Turkish Foreign Minister on Turkey’s relations with China and Xinjiang-Uighur” Cumhuriyet 28 Oct. 2010. http://www.en.cumhuriyet.com/?hn=186226. 13 Apr. 2013.

[9] Cumhuriyet. “Turkish Foreign Minister on Turkey’s relations with China and Xinjiang-Uighur” Cumhuriyet 28 Oct. 2010. http://www.en.cumhuriyet.com/?hn=186226. 13 Apr. 2013.

[10] Turkish Radio and Television. “Davutoğlu in China” TRT.net.tr 28 Oct. 2010. http://www.trt.net.tr/trtworld/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=805f396b-6999-4003-b974-50df3f118bd8. 13 Apr. 2013.

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