2016年12月17日 星期六

留埃學生的整體變遷

這幾個禮拜,花了不少時間收集與分析在民國時期,留學埃及愛資哈爾大學(Al-Azhar)的中國穆斯林文章。發現他們與現在的中國穆斯林學者,或是所謂的回族學者是很不同的類型。會有這種差異,我認為這與社會環境與政治體制有關。民國時代到愛資哈爾的中國穆斯林學生只有33位。人數雖少,卻是當時中國穆斯林菁英中的菁英,他們擔任翻譯者、外交人員、記者與文化傳播者的多重角色。
從收集到的資料顯示,這33位穆斯林當中,超過半數以上,從事阿文著作的翻譯(至今仍可以找到相關出版著作),並將片段的古蘭經文與聖訓譯成中文,供國內的穆斯林參閱。如現在中國穆斯林(包含台灣),最常參考的中譯古蘭經,則是來自其中一位留埃學生(馬堅)的翻譯。
他們同時擔任文化的傳播者,如將論語等中國古典文學譯成阿文,以及向那個時代知名的埃及穆斯林學者(Rashid Rida and Hasan al-Banna),介紹中國穆斯林的歷史。
那個時候,中國與中東的關係並不深厚,自然無所謂的中東研究。儘管如此,那些在埃及唸書的學生們,見證不少歷史事件,寫下相關的中文報導,至今仍有參考價值。

2016年11月27日 星期日

1957-1960年代《中國穆斯林》摘要與分析

前言
民國時期(1912-1949),中國穆斯林自行創辦的雜誌累積起來將近有300份。1949年中華人民共和國成立後,這些雜誌不再發行。1957年,中國伊斯蘭協會發行《中國穆斯林》期刊,但只發行到1960年,之後長達21年的時間沒有再發刊,直到1981年重新復刊到今日。透過1957-1960年這短短四年的《中國穆斯林》期刊,大致可以抓出那個時候中國穆斯林的生活樣貌。
1957-1960年《中國穆斯林》的內容重點
主旋律:永遠跟隨共產黨就不會錯
1. 共產黨解放了回族遠離舊時代與黑暗勢力。否定與拒談民國時期穆斯林的活動,特別是任何與國民黨合作的穆斯林都是伊斯蘭與回族的敗類。
2. 批判「右派穆斯林」 (馬松亭、馬震武)1957年第二期發行批判馬松亭特刊。(註:馬松亭在民國時期類似中國穆斯林總教長的地位)
3. 各地阿訇從事勞動工作:蓋水庫、工廠與種田等。
4. 實踐社會主義大改造:宗教制度改革(反西北門宦)、回漢通婚
5. 各地人民公社、大煉鋼、大躍進、 (1958年臨夏出現穆斯林聚集區人吃人的情況)1960年擁護毛主席運動。

2016年11月25日 星期五

評價中國穆斯林創刊號 (初稿)

1949年中華人民共和國成立之後,中國共產黨發動一系列的政治與社會運動,企圖改造中國社會,幾乎不分地域、種族、信仰,沒有人可置身事外。中國穆斯林自然也涉入其中。目前尚不清楚1949年到1957年這段期間,中國穆斯林的整體情況。暫時只能從一些收集到的文章片段抓出大致的方向。

從當時的一些文章中,看到西北地區的阿訇們,遭到下放從事勞改工作。另外,在民國時期,中國穆斯林景仰的大阿訇與大學者們,不知為何,忘記了聖訓的教導:在暴君面前說真話才是最大的Jihad。如民國時期的明日之星馬堅先生,於49年之後,緊緊跟隨共產黨的腳步。他在 1951年發表許多文章,內容看似談伊斯蘭信仰,其實藉伊斯蘭合理化共產黨的統治基礎,或是藉此痛斥民國時期穆斯林政治與軍事領袖(說他們是伊斯蘭敗類)。另外被譽為民國四大阿訇的達浦生,也幫共產黨搽脂抹粉,特別撰文否定「天下回回皆一家」(穆斯林皆兄弟的中國版用語)的說法。

1957年,在共產黨指示下的《中國穆斯林》雜誌出版創刊號。稍微看了目錄,發現這哪是談伊斯蘭信仰,根本是批判馬松亭阿訇特刊。

2016年11月20日 星期日

一點心得

前天看到中國穆斯林轉發一則尊重多元宗教信仰,打造友善校园环境,台湾成功大学开设礼拜点 的消息。其實這則消息是半年前來自台灣的新聞報導,最近才在「中穆網」轉載,現有七千名觀看次數。看到不少中國穆斯林的留言,感覺多數對這則新聞感到羨慕。

中國穆斯林的反應可以說是對中國社會的投射,也是對近日經濟學人這篇文章China’s other Muslims的打臉。中國穆斯林認為信仰在中國社會受到局限,無法與其他國家的穆斯林一樣,正常履行宗教義務。

但是,從學術研究來說,據我所瞭解的,很少有學術文章探討一般中國穆斯林大眾所關切的議題。現在的學術文章研究方向,不外乎是「伊斯蘭」化、本土化、教派衝突、回族名詞界定等無限循環的陳年議題。若讀者僅閱讀這些學術著作,而沒有真正接觸中國穆斯林,可能會與實際情況有所偏差。


2016年11月8日 星期二

回族文学:纪念马和福

雖然該文符合當前中國政治氣氛,不過歷史的部分可供參閱。這也顯示民國時期,西北的穆斯林,特別是在貧瘠地區的,並沒有直接受惠於那些在沿岸一帶搞運動的中國穆斯林群體。

不确定还有多少人记得这个名字。

他和毛泽东同龄,四十三岁参加红军。那时红军都很年轻,历经数年穿梭万里硝烟,普通战士平均年龄只有十九岁。而他,后来并没有幸运地成为老红军。从存留的遗照看,他戴白帽,留撇胡,有着回族男儿的朴实、冷峻与庄重,比实际年龄显得要更苍老一些。
红军战士中,他自然不算年长的。美国著名记者埃德加·斯诺在宁夏采访西征的红军时,就曾遇到一个六十四岁的李姓红军战士——“一个高大的白胡子老人,身穿一套褪色的灰布制服……走上前来,举手敬礼,戴着一顶红星军帽,太阳晒得黧黑的脸,露出了没有牙的笑容。
此前几个月,这个六旬老汉在山西洪洞摆摊卖肉。妻子已死,女儿出嫁,无所牵挂的他反对苛捐杂税,说拉屎也会被阎锡山和各级官僚征税。“他想活得有生气一些,于是冒险出城,越过黄河,投奔了红军。
李老汉学会了开枪,学会了写字,认为别人能干的自个儿也能干好。部队发给的军帽上,缀着一颗闪闪的红星。实际上,并不是每个战士的军帽上都有红五星可佩。这个年迈的战士告诉斯诺:穷人的军队在为被压迫者打仗!

非虚构:红军在陇南留下的记忆

另外一種歷史

19359,历经千难万险,走出雪山草地之后,最早迎接中央红军的村庄,是甘肃岷县哈达铺一带(现为甘肃陇南市宕昌县哈达铺镇)的旋窝村和大草滩村。
旋窝村、大草滩村当时就是回族聚居区,这也是红军穿越藏区几个月以来,第一次进驻能与群众互通汉语的村镇。在这里,红军得到了回族群众的热情款待。如今的旋窝村仍然是一个回族聚居的村落,当我们走访到村中一处庭院时,村民还特别介绍说,这是中央红军经过旋窝村时毛主席居住过的房子。
红军长征至今已经半个多世纪了。当年的这一段记忆,早已随着当事人的逝去,越来越难以寻觅。好在红军当年途经回民区的电文还在,读其文,不难从中读出一些真实的消息。以下是毛泽东1935918日发给彭德怀、彭雪枫、李富春的电文:
 
彭及彭、李:
一、岷敌守城,哈达铺无敌。第一纵队驻地回汉民众已大发动,我军纪律尚好及收敌粮食十万斤,盐二千斤。过大拉山后已无高山隘路。现一纵队驻占扎路、麻子川,纵队部驻鹿原里。
二、明十九日,你们全部开来此间,中央[][队,编者注]一科二科驻鹿原里,二纵队[]悬窝、大草滩,三纵队[]红土坡。
三、部队严整纪律,没收[财物]限于地主及反动派,违者严处,请在明日行军休息时宣布。
四、缴获手提迫击炮三门,炮弹百余发,尚在大拉。请动员战士带来,可抛弃粮食拿炮弹。
      
 十八日二十时
 
以下是彭德怀等人给朱德等人的电文:
 
朱、张、徐、陈及各军首长:
一、我们执行中央正确路线,连日击溃鲁大昌师,缴获甚多,于昨十七日占领距离岷州城哈达铺各三十里之大草滩、占扎路、高楼庄一带,前锋迫击岷州城,敌人恐慌之甚。
、此地物质丰富,民众汉回各半,十分热烈的拥护红军,三个半月来脱离群众的痛苦现在改变了。
三、请你们立即继续北进,大举消灭敌人,争取千百万群众,创造陕甘宁苏区,实现中央战略方针。
 彭、李、林、聂
 十八日   
(作者注:朱、张、徐、陈:即朱德、张国焘、徐向前、陈昌浩)

2016年11月1日 星期二

深度阅读:对话与冲突——关于新“回儒对话”

提到49年後,民國時期穆斯林知識分子的轉變。 


.主流文化下的伊斯兰教

梳理、回顾汉文译著的源起、发展与结局,不难而知,早期汉文译著大都是以经学为主,汉文为辅,供回民内部学习伊斯兰教知识,不排斥儒家文化,也不提倡“以儒诠经”、回儒对话,不对外宣教。伊斯兰教在中国的传播,一直都是只在本族本教内进行,不主张对外宣教,不求人知,也不为人知,“信而不论”,“不与人辩”。自王岱舆始,后继马注、刘智、马德新四人倡导“以儒诠经”、回儒对话,与汉族官僚文人士大夫交流对话,借以宣扬伊斯兰教,以求得主流文化的认同,并期盼朝廷能够了解、重视伊斯兰教。

他们精深的学术造诣,坚定的伊斯兰信仰,良好的举意,执着的精神,都令人赞赏和敬佩,但他们所做的回儒对话的努力,仅是他们一厢情愿的幻想,他们的一片良苦用心最终归于失败。

儒家文化原本不排斥外来文化,孔子思想中就有“和而不同”、“和为贵”的思想。儒家文化奉行的是一种世俗的政治哲学和人生哲学,在信仰上,相信“天”,但对“天”的属性并不深究,持“敬鬼神而远之”、“未知生,焉知死”,“未能事人,焉能事鬼,”的态度,知“天命”而不履行“天命”,更注重现世社会。而伊斯兰教信仰真主,对真主的属性有着细致的认知,注重履行 “主命”,现世后世并重。二者在信仰理念上有所不同,关于现世社会的纲常伦理价值观念却又有着某些共通之处,并不相排斥,伊斯兰教与儒家文化完全可以求同存异,和而不同,共存不悖。正是有着这样能够共存的基础,伊斯兰教才得以在中国和平发展,落地生根,传承千年。

共同生存在同一块土地上,回汉民族互相包容互相尊重相互交融也是正常现象,应顺其自然。回回民族族源成分多半是汉民。唐时即有侨居中国的“大食国人”李彦升,“生于异域”而具“华心”,终进士及第;唐末五代时又有著名的一代词学大家李珣,本“蜀中土生波斯”,著有《琼瑶集》,同时精通药学,著有《海药本草》;明代,郑和后代则半回半汉;穆斯林出身的海瑞生前早已没了穆斯林的特征,海口的海瑞墓却建有非穆斯林的神道;李贽也是酒肉穿肠过,参禅论道,以和尚自称;曾经经学兴盛汉文译著繁荣的江南地区回民如今大多已汉化;而甘肃回民中竟也有一支孔子后裔,信仰伊斯兰教,取名却要去山东曲阜;北大校长马寅初生前曾与北大穆斯林教授马坚有过一次对话,称其祖上曾经也是回民。如此事例不胜枚举,这些都是不同民族同生共存过程中 正常自然的相互交融,回民也是在这正常自然的融合中发展壮大。

2016年10月26日 星期三

中國人染上了「伊斯蘭恐懼症」?

飲食問題,會成為中國族群矛盾甚至衝突的一個觸發點嗎?這雖然聽起來有些荒謬,但並不是絕無可能。9月,有網民在微博發帖,指責作為「中國高等學府」的北京大學實行「種族隔離」,因為該校清真食堂「佟園」在其服務指南中寫道,專門服務於10個少數民族的師生,其他人員不得在那裡用餐。如新浪微博用戶@寞洑在帖子中寫道:「北大穆斯林專用餐廳……完全符合現代世俗社會中對種族隔離公共設施的定義。」

清真飲食引發糾紛,這在中國並不是第一次。今年以來,有人指責一些往返新疆的航班只提供清真餐,是對非穆斯林的不尊重。多年來一直有人大代表在「兩會」上提出的意在規範清真食品生產經營的清真食品管理立法提案,被一些學者認為威脅到了「政教分離」,因而反對清真食品立法。如中國社會科學院研究生院馬克思主義研究系教授習五一在其微博上寫道,清真食品立法「違反憲法政教分離的原則」。
也許令人難以理解的是,清真餐廳與清真飲食,開始成為中國族群矛盾的聚焦點。然而有趣的是,至少從幾百年前開始,清真飲食就一直是中國飲食文化的一部分,早已「融入」中國文化,經常光顧清真餐館的除了穆斯林外,還有大量非穆斯林。在中國歷史上,即使是意識形態統治一切的文革時代,清真飲食也沒有成為被攻擊的對象。從過去到現在,在對亞伯拉罕宗教不熟悉的普通中國人看來,清真飲食只是代表著一種不同的風俗,不一定帶有宗教意義。

佟園、飛機清真餐、清真食品立法這幾個事例,真的如一些人所說,具有很強的宗教性,反映了伊斯蘭教「封閉」、「排他」的屬性嗎?其實,20144月發佈的佟園餐廳的這份規定,更多可能是出於管理方便:穆斯林師生對嚴格的清真飲食的需求較為強烈,而該食堂的容量又有限,所以它優先考慮穆斯林;非穆斯林有大量其他選擇,故這對他們的影響不大。何況,這只是該食堂的服務指南,並非成文法律,如果該規定確實引起了非穆斯林的不滿,更改起來很容易,並不是一個不可解決的問題。

2016年9月12日 星期一

Anti-Muslim Sentiment Is Taking Over China's Social Media Scene

 Chinese social media is quite different from traditional media in many ways; netizens, for instance, express their support or criticism of certain social groups more aggressively, with much less reserve. This is due partially to the government’s tight control of television broadcasters and newspapers, which does not allow any deviation from the official line. Conversely, China’s Internet is relatively open – government’s control notwithstanding, a netizen can post angry comments from time to time with impunity.

Discussions on Muslims and Islam has been a taboo for China’s traditional media for several decades. I do not know the exact time when this began, but according to conventional wisdom and experience in the media, it dates back to the Mao Zedong era. When metropolitan newspapers and television programs flourished during the 1990s, it became even more difficult to report on Muslim issues.
Some foreign observers tend to forget that China has 56 ethnic groups and quite a few of them are predominantly Muslims, most notably the Hui and the Uyghurs. China is home to 20 million Muslims. That number may seem insignificant compared to 1.4 billion, but the government cannot afford to treat Muslims lightly. As a result, Beijing — and thus state-controlled media — has been careful in maintaining good relations between different ethnic groups and their religions. Official propaganda on ethnic issues seeks to strengthen minority groups’ identification with China and to avoid separatist tendencies due to ethnic and religious conflicts. For example, the popular song “56 Nationalities and 56 Flowers”  ends with the line “love our China.”

To that end, traditional media tightly restricts the way ethnic issues — particularly Muslim issues — are represented. When I was working at a media agency years ago, there was a ban on running anything related to pork or pigs along with stories about Muslims. As another example, I remember reading an interview with then Israeli President Shimon Peres, and right next to it there was another interview about Arab countries, despite the fact the Peres did not mention the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but only talked about Israel’s relations with China. Such arrangements by the media were intended to serve the national interest, fostering a positive environment both for solidarity among China’s different ethnic groups and religions and China’s relations with Muslim countries around the world.

The emergence of social media has changed everything. Recently, some netizens have been expressing dissatisfaction, in some cases quite aggressively, with China’s supposedly “soft” policy toward its Muslim population. Some netizens even took to humiliating and insulting Muslims in China and the Middle East. This anti-Muslim sentiment found on social media poses new challenges for China’s regulators tackling ethnic and religious issues.

Plenty of examples indicate there is a surge of hostility on China’s social media toward Muslims. Netizens have invented a new phrase – “Green Religion” — to refer to Islam, due to the color’s significance in the religion (including the color’s inclusion in most national flags of Muslim countries). Muslims, then, are referred to be the invested phrase “the Greens” — an openly derogatory term. Each time an attack occurs in the West, for instance when news came out about the attacks in Paris or Brussels, it sparked heated discussions on China’s social media, and some would suggest that “this must have been done by the Greens.”

Such attacks are the first reason why China’s netizens have turned against Muslims. An increase in terrorist attacks has awakened the Chinese to the threat of terrorism. Since most of these attacks were carried out by Muslims, netizens’ attitude toward Muslims in general has deteriorated.
China has suffered fewer terrorist attacks compared to the West, but the number of attacks has been increasing, especially in the western part of China, for example in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The suicide bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan is another case in point. The interesting thing is, while China told its people to support Arab countries, especially the Palestinian cause, during Mao and Deng’s time, China’s netizens now are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel taking military action against Arab countries.

As an example, the head of Al Jazeera’s Beijing office has a Weibo account and almost every post is subject to attacks. Some comments are extremely hostile  – “Pack up and go back to the Middle East” — or even violent — “We support Israel’s killing of you all.”

The refugee crisis has also contributed to negative views toward Muslims among the Chinese. Chinese pride themselves on their hardworking image, and many of them look down upon refugees from the Middle East, especially physically strong men who smuggled their way to Europe. Most of China’s netizens dismiss the refugees as mobs, or agents working for Islamic State; the refugees are labeled “lazy” and a security liability to the world. This dynamic also feeds into Chinese netizen’s growing anti-Muslim sentiment.

China’s netizens are now making fun of Europe’s policy on refugees, especially German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to accept refugees. Many netizens say in a mocking tone that Germany will turn “Green” one day and Europe will become “Europestan.” When some leaders in the West suggested that China should also accept some refugees from the Middle East, it was rejected flat out on China’s social media. Some netizens even suggested China should let the refugees stay in the West to bring more disasters on Western countries.

In addition to events overseas, however, China’s domestic policy has also been responsible for the hostility toward Muslims online. As was mentioned earlier, China has been trying to maintain the cohesion between different ethnic groups and religions over several decades, but this has now sparked a backlash on the social media.

For example, China is building large numbers of mosques in its western region, and construction has even extended to Shenzhen, a developed city on the east coast. Some Muslim communities in the western region have started learning Arabic at school, and road signs now have Arabic along with Chinese. Some Muslim women in China have adopted the wearing of the hijab or even black burqas. The spread of visually identifiable signs of Muslim identity has led to criticism online. Some netizens blame these changes on China’s misguided ethnic and religious policy; some even went so far as to compare Beijing’s policy toward Muslims to the appeasement of the Nazis before World War II. They believe if this tendency is not curbed, the Han Chinese position as China’s dominant ethnic group will be at stake.

These comments stem from a deep-seated fear that China may also “turn Green” one day. The hostility toward Muslims is in fact also an objection toward what they consider as China’s misguided ethnic and religious policy, which is viewed as too soft on Muslims. Since such sentiments could never appear on television and newspapers controlled by the government, the Internet has become their battlefield.

The dominant ethnic group in China is the Han, making up around 90 percent of the total population; unsurprisingly, then, most Chinese netizens also happen to be Han Chinese. This is why anti-Muslim views that espouse a sense of superiority of the Han Chinese are able to gather considerable support. Adding to this is the obtrusive presence of Muslims in some parts of the country, which leads to further animosity among the Han Chinese.

During Ramadan several months ago, one major street in China’s biggest city Shanghai was sealed off to allow tens of thousands of Muslims to line up to pray toward Mecca. Photos of the scene deeply unnerved the “Han nationalists” and increased their anxiety about the prospect of “China’s fall into Muslim hands,” following the example of Europe.

China’s social media also regularly churn out stories about conflicts between the country’s Muslim and non-Muslim communities. For example, some Muslims demand that there should be no smell of pork in their neighborhood. In other incidents, some Muslims, believing the trucks carrying Halal food are not clean, have forced their way onto the trucks for inspections. Once these small-scale conflicts are labeled as a Muslim issue, they immediately go viral on social media, which further antagonizes China’s netizens against Muslims.

In the most recent case, the tragic murder-suicide of a mother and her four children in Gansu province has also been given an anti-Muslim context by netizens. Media reports have blamed extreme poverty for the grisly case. Some netizens, however, blame ethnic policy — they argue that the government should not spend money on mosques when people are living in poverty.


Only rational debate can lead to a more secure China. The rise of aggressive anti-Muslim sentiments on social media is a worrisome step in the wrong direction.

2016年9月6日 星期二

Shariah With Chinese Characteristics: A Scholar Looks at the Muslim Hui

Matthew S. Erie, a trained lawyer and ethnographer who teaches at Oxford University, lived for two years in Linxia, a small city in the northwestern Chinese province of Gansu. Known as China’s Mecca, it is a center of religious life for the Hui, an ethnic minority numbering 10 million who practice Islam. Along with the Turkic Uighurs, they are one of 10 officially recognized ethnic groups that practice Islam, making the total population of Muslims in China around 23 million, according to the 2010 government census.

Mr. Erie’s recently published book, “China and Islam: The Prophet, the Party, and Law,” is a look at how Shariah — Islamic law and ethics — is implemented among the Hui. In an interview he discussed his findings, which confound many preconceptions about Shariah, Chinese law and the rigidity of the Communist state.

How should we understand the statistics on Muslims in China? Officially there are 23 million, but this assumes that Islam is an ethnicity, and that all Hui, or all Uighurs, must be Muslim.

It’s a problematic issue because it’s an ethnic category that is used to define members of a religion. Hence, it can be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. For the former, Muslims outside of China may not consider every Hui to be a Muslim. Many Hui are very pious. They attend mosque regularly and go to the hajj. And then there are people who say they’re Hui, meaning they just don’t eat pork. For the latter, it’s possible that some Chinese citizens who are ethnically Han [the dominant ethnic group in China] or Tibetan are, in fact, Muslims. It’s a very loose category.

2016年7月13日 星期三

闾丘露薇:中国新闻媒体和社交媒体上的反穆斯林情绪研究

【编者按】近日,共识网就中国新闻媒体和社交媒体上的反穆斯林情绪这一研究主题采访到了美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学在读博士闾丘露薇女士。闾丘露薇,曾担任凤凰卫视全球新闻总监,是著名的记者、资深媒体人,因2003年在伊拉克战争时作为在巴格达地区唯一的华人女记者进行现场报道,被誉为战地玫瑰。著作有《我已出发》《行走中的玫瑰》《不分东西》《利比亚战地日记》等。
  访谈人:共网国际频道黄南。
  共网:丘老您好,昨天我听了您在和和平论坛关于“中国新媒体和社交媒体上的反穆斯林情”的演请问这象是如何引起您的关注和研究趣的?
  中文媒体言没有控制
  丘露薇:我有个感想做个研究是去年的候,关于叙利亚难民的事情在网上特讨论多。我得当有中文媒体——应该是海外的,有人写文章,讨论中文网上的歧言、仇视语言。文章指出,然在国外种仇视语言也很多,但仇视语言通常会被网站管理员删除甚至可能要承担法律后果,尤其是宗教方面的仇恨言,是有后果的,但在中文网上,反而对这些没有什么太多控制,所以一眼看上去很多。我因接受了博士训练,所以然有种感,在中文网上仇穆斯林的言很多,但是最只是一种假,需要去论证。因很多候你看到的,未必真的那么重,所以我和我的同事才会做个研究。

Wounds that fester: Histories of Chinese Islamophobia

網路對同治年間回民起義的「另類解讀」 Sometime in March 2019 the  Baike Baidu page   about the Great Northwestern Muslim Rebellion ( 陕甘回民起...